The fickle-ometer was dropping and peaking for all its worth during last night’s 3-3 draw with Germany. Aside from a 3-minute spell during the first half and up to the 67th minute when Foden and Sterling were replaced, England were back to their insipid worst, ponderous on the ball, drained of confidence, and showing precious little attacking intent aside from some half-hearted notions about counterattacking. The feeling that we were on the cusp of major tournament humiliation on the scale of Euro ’88 and Euro 2000 was palpable.

But then, the substitutions. Sterling, who improved slightly from a real shocker against Italy, had squandered good chances to score and set up Kane, and Foden, who ran around a lot and took some corners, went off. On came Saka and Mount. Saka, played out of position and looking all at sea against Italy, played as a right sided attacker here and looked like his Arsenal self, offered purposeful dribbling and a constant attacking threat. Mount, played nominally on the left, but like Saka, showed excellent attacking intent, none more so encapsulated than by a superbly taken equaliser. It felt like the tide had shifted, suddenly we had momentum and confidence, players we know that are capable of great things looked like playing to their potential instead of being spooked by their own shadow. An England team forced to take the initiative feels like the England team we all hope for at kick off, but time and again, doesn’t materialize in the big games.

Crucially, game-state has a huge influence on how the subs and the subbed off players shape the game. Perhaps it’s slightly unfair to be critical of Sterling and Foden when they are tactically limited by what the manager allows the rest of the team to do in supporting their attacking endeavours. However, given England were able to eke out a small handful of decent chances – none of which were taken – it suggests that for a gameplan that relies on exploiting the thinnest of margins, the personnel involved are incorrect.

None more so are razor thin margins of error more ruthlessly taken advantage of than by high level international teams against back lines who aren’t quite at it. Maguire, looking unfit, immobile and uncomfortable for 180 minutes against two decent enough sides, cannot be expected to excel given his current state of fitness and confidence. Nick Pope, usually a good shot stopper but with all the footwork skills that comfortably place him in the “bad touch for a big man” bracket, can no longer be reasonably considered England’s #2 goalkeeper. If the distribution and technique alone isn’t enough to convince you, spilling a routine save out for Havertz to gift the Germans the easiest possible equaliser should be.

As evidenced by the Euro 2020 final, Southgate does not trust himself or his team to be brave in the biggest moments. Hemmed into their own half by a pair of centre backs with a combined age of 71, only once with the game at 1-1 were England able to get in behind, at which point Chiellini knew his race was run and cynically hauled down Saka. Having seen the potential path to victory, it never felt like Southgate was interested in pursuing it, only continuing with his “Game Management as a Service” (GaaS) tactic, in which only the low risk, low reward percentages are played.

A cold, hard dedication to a percentage game, coupled with unerring loyalty to players who are not performing, is not conducive to major tournament victories. Even in better times, collective momentum is not enough to hide the weaknesses of those players who are not performing. Never has there been a more important or obvious moment for Southgate to ditch the habit of lifetime and stop playing his favourites. But it seems unthinkable for a man so set in his ways to change now.

Today’s feeling: Glass half full. Out in the group stage but we win 1 game.